2 Important Posts You May Want to Check Out Today

Has it been a while since I've posted here?

It has. It has.

But I've been busy and as you can see not with this site.

What I've been working on is a site that's focused in large part on collecting quotes from or writing reviews of books by great writers such as Nevil Shute and Joseph Mitchell.

Fear not, however.

I came back to share a couple of links that I know readers of this site will be interested in.

For example, there's a post on what counted as money before even gold and why that may matter to your financial security today. And there's an earlier post, which you should actually read first, that is a review of a book called Paper Money Collapse on the coming monetary breakdown.

Will you like them?

I don't know.

Love them?

I also don't know.

But if you're interested in this site because you're concerned about gaining more wealth and all the freedom it provides, you'll definitely find something of value over there, particularly in the two posts linked to above.

Check 'em out then and I'll be back here at some point with more links to the news you're looking for (most likely, judging by the traffic, on David Einhorn).

Third Avenue Hires David Resnick

So, according to this report from Morningstar, David Resnick will be joining Morningstar in September 2012.

Who is David Resnick?

Resnick "made his name as an advisor on bankruptcies and restructurings for many years and who in fact had worked with fund-family founder Marty Whitman on Public Service of New Hampshire's restructuring in the late 1980s."


What does his hire mean for fundholders?


Again according to the report, "In the tight-knit network of bankruptcies and reorganizations, Resnick's rolodex and expertise...should come in handy for many years to come. Overall, it's a positive development for a firm that has succeeded with distressed investing in the past."

3 Short Quotes from Ken Heebner

So, Ken Heebner hasn't been getting the best of returns of late. In fact, as this article points out, he's been getting rather bad returns--and for a while.

Nevertheless, as these three quotes show, Heebner hasn't changed his general strategy:

1. "“Most people think this is the worst time in the world to be optimistic, but my portfolio is positioned for strength in the U.S. . . I am functioning in a contrarian mode.”

2. "[Negative sentiment] historically has been associated with maximum points of opportunity for investing."

3.  "I am completely outside the mainstream. I see the mainstream in the distance."

Will Heebner's fund come back yet again? Or is an investment in the banks ultimately a doomed strategy?


My own view is that if anyone can pull off a successful investment in them from here that man is Heebner--but even so I wouldn't want to join him in the bet.

How to Play Poker (or Invest) Like David Einhorn

In some circles, David Einhorn is admired as much (or even more) for his poker abilities than his investing skills. But as Einhorn himself points out in this article his strategy with both is similar. 

Einhorn has said his approach to poker resembles his approach to investing: He doesn’t play a lot of hands. When “the situation feels right, I put in a big, aggressive raise with a marginal holding,” he said in a 2006 speech. “It is very hard to describe how I know the ‘feel,’ and sometimes I get it completely wrong. But to do well in a poker tournament, you have to recognize a few non-traditional opportunities and you need to get people to sometimes fold the better hand. I think we invest similarly. By this, I mean that most of our investing lines up nicely in the disciplined, traditional value camp—very low multiples of book value, revenues, earnings, etc., but occasionally we are opportunistic and invest in situations that are difficult to justify under traditional criteria."

The article contains some inaccuracies--for example, Einhorn wasn't bluffing and thus couldn't have been out-bluffed--but in addition to the above it contains how many millions Einhorn won playing poker this time and how Einhorn felt doing so.

How Warren Buffett Earned His Billions

At one of my new blogs, which both focuses on how to read a book the 80/20 way and helps you to do so, I share a quote from The Dhandho Investor on how Buffett achieved his billions:

...Minimizing downside risk while maximizing the upside is a powerful concept. It is the reason Mr. Buffett has a net worth of over $40 billion. He got there by taking minimal risk while always maximizing returns. Most of the time, assets trade hands at or above their intrinsic value. The key, however, is to wait patiently for that super-fast pitch down the center.

While I have qualms about recommending the book wholeheartedly, as I say at the end of that post, the above point is dead on, and the book itself is definitely a worthwhile read. 

To see for that yourself, however--or at least to screen the book much better--check out the 8 quotes on achieving high returns with low risk that I share from it.

This year, for Mother's Day, David Einhorn gave his mom "naches" like you wouldn't believe

So let's review. This week, David Einhorn:

• made a lot of money when Herbalife and Green Mountain crashed
• took down the Fed in an article that used the Simpsons as examples, and...
• won a poker tournament for Hillel.

I don't know if any Jewish mom can top that for naches this year, but I doubt it.

8 Tips on Investing The Third Avenue Way

In a recent report by Third Avenue Value, Ian Lapey discussed the philosophy which has led to Third Avenue's investing success. Here are eight tips from that report, that you might find helpful:

1. "Focus on the balance sheet and readily ascertainable net asset value."
2. "Only invest in common stocks issued by companies with strong financial positions."
3. "Focus on the long term."
4. "Worry about investment risk, not market risk."
5. "Do not try to pick the bottom."
6. "Avoid industries in secular decline."
7. "Own the fulcrum security [in a company's capital structure]."
8. "Pay close attention to a management team's long-term track record and incentives."

For more on each, click over to read a paragraph going into more detail on each. And then, having done that, I wish you the best in applying them for profit!

Ian Lapey Seems Very Happy with Third Avenue's Investments in Hong Kong

Morninstar recently interviewed Ian Lapey about a trip he made to Asia investigating the strength or weakness of Third Avenue's (real estate) investments.

In general, Lapey expressed being pleased with what he saw. In particular, however, he repeatedly noted the discount to NAV that the fund's Hong Kong investments are selling at, the speed at which they're compounding NAV, and the strength of store traffic at particular locations in HK.

Check out the interview for more. There's video and a full transcript, with highlights, at the fund's web site.

I have just one question, however: If Lapey is so pleased, why did the fund recently decrease its position in Cheung Kong Holdings (by 3.4 million shares), and Henderson Land Development Company (by 14.3 million shares), and Wharf Holdings (by 1.2 million shares)?

Perhaps it's just portfolio rebalancing. Holders of the fund should be on the lookout, however, to see if the trend continues.

Einhorn's Current Thoughts on the Global Economy

Although we're sure to hear more details of his macro thoughts, and soon, in the recent conference call discussing Greenlight Capital Re's Q1 2012 results, Einhorn noted being concerned of...

• the structural debt problems in Europe and Japan
• the slowing Chinese economy
• high oil prices, and
• general inflation connected to the Fed's 0% interest rate policy.

What is he doing about it?

Again, we're likely to get more news on this soon, but in the call he mentioned owning...

• longs or shorts on an individual, non-macro, and compelling basis
• gold bars,
• gold miners, and
• other macro hedges.

You can read a full transcript of his comments over at Seeking Alpha.

Seeking Alpha Article Quotes Marty Whitman

A post by Chuck Carnevale showed up in my news feed today because it contained quotes from both Warren Buffett and Marty Whitman (among others).

It's a good post, and one that that readers of this blog may enjoy reading in full. As an example of its value, here's the quote by Marty Whitman:

"I remain impressed with how much easier it is for us, and everybody else who has modicum of training, to determine what a business is worth, and what the dynamics of the business might be, compared with estimating the prices at which a non-arbitrage security will sell in near-term markets."

This, Carnevale says, basically means that "it's easier to value a business based on analyzing its fundamentals than it is to try and guess where the price of the stock may go over the short to intermediate term."

I agree with that, as well as some other things from the post. Here's the link for anyone who'd like to read it in full.

Marty Whitman Retires

Chuck Jaffe generously praises Marty Whitman in this short piece on his decision to step down from managing the Third Avenue Value Fund.

While I disagree with parts of it, Jaffe accurately identifies Whitman's admirable long-term track record--and the three words that Whitman's style boils down to: "safe and cheap."

The whole thing's worth a read, even for those of us who have been following the fund for some time and give Ian Lapey more credit than Jaffe seems to.

The Headline that Made David Einhorn Smile

I have no inside information on this, but I'd be willing to bet that the following headline made David Einhorn smile:

Starbucks To Sell Single-Cup Brewer Verismo, Green Mountain Tanks

I saw this in my Facebook news feed, prefaced by my friend saying, "This looks promising." Indeed it does--but especially for those short Green Mountain shares.

What's Ken Heebner Investing in Now?

Seeking Alpha has a post going over some of Heebner's current top picks. Worth checking out, even if (like me) you think investing in financials like Citigroup is madness.

You Can't Blame David Einhorn

As the recently released transcript of David Einhorn talking to the CEO of Punch makes clear, David Einhorn was right to sell out of the company. Here's an excerpt of the phone call:

PUNCH CEO: Well, I -- I think -- I -- I think the market sort of dictates this. I don’t think it’s a matter for the market to dictate that. We -- our view is simple, that is, that, you know, we have to make sure that we can preserve a sensible headroom to the covenant from a securitisation and -- and take out the convertible as the -- the maximum and minimum requirement of any discussion. But there’s absolutely -- if you go back over the history, and I know -- I -- and I -- and I perfectly respect that you’ve not been involved from the beginning, but when we originally floated the company, we did an initial public offering of 116 million pounds. We have only done since that time --, that’s 161 million pounds. We have only done, since that time, 175 million pounds [inaudible]. So, to be absolutely clear, I don’t -- I don’t look at the business from an equity perspective and if -- you know, and it’s not my intention to over-equitise this business whatsoever. The transactions that we’ve done, for example, we’ve shown, pretty substantially dispassion in what we’ve sold to ensure that we maximise value on the debt and, so this -- so it’s merely about making sure that -- and we can turn around to the shareholders and say, “Actually, anything that we do is sufficient to give ourselves a – headroom for a considerable period of time into the future and also addresses the convertible”. That’s the maximum and that would be the minimum that would be worth considering.

DAVID EINHORN: Mm hmm. So, would you -- as you pencil that out, what do those amounts turn out to be?

ANDREW OSBORNE: Something like 350 sterling.

DAVID EINHORN: 350 million sterling?

ANDREW OSBORNE: If you were -- if you were to roughly sort of work on the basis that you kinda took out the -- the converts, and that’s something that gives you, say, 10 percent headroom in within both of the covenants, filed covenants.

DAVID EINHORN: Wow, wow. That would be shockingly horrifying from my perspective. Can you sell half the company just at a buck and a half -- a Euro -- a pound and half? Oh, no.

ANDREW OSBORNE: So those proceeds are applied to buying back debt at say 60 in the pound and remember any --

DAVID EINHORN: Who cares -- --

PUNCH CEO: [inaudible].

DAVID EINHORN: -- who cares, who cares, after a year of going through this, now we’re going to dilute ourselves like this. Oh, no.

ANDREW OSBORNE: Why do you get diluted?

DAVID EINHORN: Because you doubled the share capital almost.

PUNCH CFO: Yeah, but [overspeaking]...

Consider what Einhorn just heard. He just heard the CEO of a company he owns a large amount of equity in tell him that he doesn't view the business from the perspective of an equity holder. Later on, the CEO doesn't even appear to understand how nearly doubling the share count will dilute current equity-holders.

I'd sell as many shares as I could after that conversation, assuming I owned any. To the point, however, Einhorn has no duty to other shareholders to not sell shares of a company when he learns something such as this affecting Greenlight's investment.

The only person in a fiduciary position here is that CEO. You can blame him for being an idiot many times over. But you can't blame Einhorn--or at least shouldn't.

Marty Whitman Quotes (from Third Avenue's Recent Letter)

Third Avenue's latest shareholder letter is a great read.

At its start, Marty Whitman basically provides a condensed view of his book, Value Investing: A Balanced Approach--which serves as either a nice teaser for those who haven't read the book or a nice refresher for those who have.

Throughout the letter, a number of one-liners are made. Whitman points out, for example, that "analysts really ought not to use the word 'risk' without putting an adjective in front of it." Similarly, he says, "Economists have it wrong when they say, 'There is no free lunch.' What they should say is, 'Somebody has to pay for lunch.'"

Later, James Montier is quoted saying, "The idea that the risk of an investment, or indeed, a portfolio of investments can be reduced to a single number is utter madness." And Thomas LaPointe observes that, "A disorderly Italian default would be at least ten times greater than a Lehman Brothers event."

Anyhow, there's much more in the letter; you can read it here.

David Sokol on Minimizing Mistakes

SFGate recently reported on the management philosophy of David Sokol, one of Buffett's highly-praised business managers. While noting that details can be found in Sokol's book, Pleased but Not Satisfied, the article itself summarizes a few of the lessons. Regarding minimizing mistakes, for example, it says:

In Sokol's mind, operational excellence consists of paying attention to detail and minimizing the making of mistakes or other small problems that could turn into big issues. For example, some oil companies have been cited numerous times for a lack of attention to seemingly small manners, and that have resulted in oil pipeline leaks or oil well explosions. In many cases, these damaging events might have been less severe, or could even been prevented with attention to seemingly minor maintenance activities. Because of a lack of attention to detail, the last oil company might experience huge declines in its reputation and profits. Openness and candidness are other key ingredients to excellence, according to Sokol. In his words, "the more uncomfortable the situation, the more valuable a candid conversation becomes."

There's nothing revolutionary there; it's really just the basics. But actually doing what is "basic" is another story. And Buffett loves those who do the basics well, decade after decade.

Short Stocks Like David Einhorn?

Business Insider recently linked to an interview with David Einhorn in which he lays out how he short stocks--or at least how he did it in this past financial crisis. Here's the relevant section:

Interviewer: Okay. I guess I want you to continue to sort of chronologically in August of ’07, as you said you see BNP Paribas freeze redemptions and that gives concern and you’re talking to the rating agencies among other things and you’ve identified the type of companies that you had concerns about. Can you just sort of take us through chronologically through the end of ’07 and into ’08 and how things changed, if at all, for you folks?

David Einhorn: Yeah absolutely. So this is sometime in August, we put on a bunch of positions and our team here basically divided up the names for sort of further work cause we wanted to figure out which were the ones that were the most exposed. Whereas the initial couple dozen was ticked off relatively quickly over the course of a weekend, which is not our normal amount of time to [do] due diligence, but I felt that given what was going on, there may not be a lot of time. And so we began putting on those couple dozen positions a little faster than we ordinarily would if we were just researching an individual security.

So from there we began concentrating our work and trying to figure out well which were the better, more exposed companies and which were the less exposed companies and over the course of the next couple of months, we focused the list down and we covered a number of the shorts and we increased a number of the shorts as we focused on the people that we thought were most vulnerable.

In sum, Einhorn quickly shorted a group of businesses in an industry with problems, worked feverishly to differentiate the worst of that bunch from the best, and then covered his shorts or added to them accordingly. You can check out the rest of the interview at Santangel's Review.

Third Avenue Discusses their Leucadia Investment

In the latest annual report for Third Avenue Value, Amit Wadhwaney discusses his fund's investment in Leucadia. Here is the relevant excerpt:

Leucadia National Corp. (“Leucadia”) is a NYSE-listed holding company. Run by Ian Cumming and Joe Steinberg since its founding in the late seventies, Leucadia has compounded the NAV of its portfolio by about 18.5% per annum, on average, over the last 30 years.

Given such a long-term track record, it is hardly surprising that Leucadia’s stock has rarely been inexpensive. There have, however, been opportunities to purchase these shares at attractive valuations following sizable double-digit declines in stated book value, as occurred in 1999 and 2008. In 2008, mark-to-market losses on several of its investments resulted in a decline of over 55% in its stated book value. The company also took sizable accounting write-downs to its deferred tax asset. The resultant negative impacts on reported earnings and book value drew the ire of the market at large, and the company’s stock price plummeted to what we deemed to be unusually attractive levels.

While the mark-to-market declines and writedowns in these various assets conformed to accounting standards, the resultant declines in reported earnings and book value pushed many investors to the exits and provided us with precisely the type of opportunity that we look for – a short-term distraction which allowed us to partner, at bargain prices, with a management team which has proven its ability to grow NAV at truly exceptional rates over the past 30 years.

It was not particularly surprising that Leucadia recognized substantial accounting losses during the depths of the financial crisis, in early 2009. Its portfolio included equity and royalty interests in a large-scale, Australian iron ore mining operation and another base metals mining company, the market values of which had declined reflecting expectations of poor near-term profitability. In addition it held significant investments in a U.S.-based, full-service investment banking and securities firm, which, while its security price declined during the financial crisis,

had employed its strong balance sheet to expand its work force and build its market presence during a period when its competitors closed shop or retrenched. Our conclusion was that these reported losses did not represent a true permanent impairment to the underlying businesses and the long-term fundamentals of the businesses remained attractive.

Additionally, the sizable write-downs of deferred tax assets, which exceeded $1.5 billion in 2008 alone, were prompted by a mechanical interpretation of accounting law; but, had neither any negative effects on cash-flow, nor, we suspected, any longer-term economic repercussions. Presumably, when business conditions were to moderate, these substantial tax assets would once again be available to provide protection from taxes on future realized investment results; and given the aforementioned track record of the company, we believed that the odds of Leucadia delivering value realization in the future were in our favor.

Let us look more closely at these mark-to-market writedowns which helped spark a sell-off in Leucadia’s share price. Did they instill widespread fear in the market? Yes. Would such write-downs be undeniably unpleasant, if not downright scary, for those investors/speculators with shortterm time horizons and/or leveraged portfolios? Certainly. But from Third Avenue’s perspective – that of a long-term, fundamental investor which does not employ financial leverage – these accounting write-downs were merely distractions from the key factors in our analysis, and largely irrelevant to the consideration of economic book values which were considerably longer term in nature.

We find a bit of irony in that last point; specifically, that the environment which scared many investors out of Leucadia stock was precisely the type of environment in which Leucadia has historically been able to sow the seeds of long-term value creation. This point is one that should be clear to anybody who has analyzed Leucadia’s history, but also one which was, to many, drowned out by the noise of reported accounting statistics and general market anxiety. In this case, such noise ultimately lacked relevance to the fundamental, long-term health of the underlying business, and to the key factors which played into our decision to invest. Among these factors were the unusually cheap valuation at which we were able to invest, the longterm track record of value creation and the aforementioned exceptional tax attributes.

As usual, Marty Whitman and the rest of the Third Avenue team not only give you a lot of insight into their own picks but also into the mechanics of good investing. You can read the full report here.

Was Buffett's 1984 Prediction Proven Correct?

In a speech arguing that the efficient market theory is bogus, Warren Buffett identified 9 fund managers who he said would beat the market.

He claimed he didn’t pick these people because they already had an outstanding track record. He said he selected these people years ago based upon their framework for investment decision-making. Of course finance professors didn’t believe him, and many questioned his motivation. Warren Buffett was arguing that markets were inefficient, whereas professors were arguing they were.

That speech was back in 1984. Who was correct--Warren Buffett or the finance professors?Insider Monkey has the score at Business Insider.

Update: Fooling Some of the People

A bit over a year ago I pointed to my review of David Einhorn's book Fooling Some of the People All the Time, saying that you could read the opening paragraphs online. Since that time, Einhorn has linked to that review from the book's website and the editor of The Objective Standard has allowed the review to be read in full online. Enjoy!